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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
Case No. 900484-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
On March 2, 1992, this Court issued its opinion in 
State v. Lopez. Case No. 900484-CA (Utah App. March 2, 1992). 
A copy of the slip opinion, which contains both a majority and 
concurring and dissenting opinions, is attached to this petition in 
Appendix A. 
Mr. Lopez requests rehearing of this case. See Brown v. 
Pickard, 11 P. 512 (Utah 1886) (explaining circumstances allowing 
rehearing); Cumminas v. Nielson, 129 P. 619 (Utah 1913) (same). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THIS COURT SHOULD ASSUME THAT THE 
TRIAL JUDGE MADE FINDINGS IN ACCORDANCE WITH 
HIS CONCLUSION THAT THIS WAS A PRETEXT STOP AND 
AFFIRM THE ORDER SUPPRESSING EVIDENCE. 
Both the majority and concurring and dissenting opinions 
fail to consider the oral findings made by the trial judge during 
the hearing, fail to give the required deference to the trial judge, 
and fail to make the required assumption that the judge made 
findings of fact in accordance with his decision. See Lopez. 
slip op. at 11, 16-17, 19-27. 
It is well established that the trial court sits in an 
advantaged position for purposes of making factual findings and that 
his findings must be given deference. See, e.g.. State v. Ashe. 745 
P.2d 1255, 1258 and n.5 (Utah 1987). In addition, 
in cases in which factual issues are presented 
to and must be resolved by the trial court but 
no findings of fact appear in the record, we 
"assume that the trier of facts found them in 
accord with its decision, and we affirm the 
decision if from the evidence it would be 
reasonable to find facts to support it." 
State v. Ramirez. 817 P.2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (emphasis added). 
At the end of footnote 6 in Ramirez. the Utah Supreme Court included 
a string cite listing several Utah cases which support the 
proposition that the appellate court "upholds the trial court even 
if it failed to make findings on the record whenever it would be 
reasonable to assume that the court actually made such findings." 
Id. at 788 n.6. 
In the lead opinion, rather than giving deference to the 
trial judge and assuming that his findings were in accordance with 
his conclusion, this Court looks at the testimony in the light most 
favorable to the State. However, the trial judge ruled against the 
State in this case, and facts must therefore be resolved in 
accordance with his ruling. For instance, this Court stated: 
The officer testified he stopped defendant's 
car because he believed defendant was Cruz, 
believed defendant was driving without a 
license and because he saw defendant make a 
turn without signaling. 
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sup op. at ll. 
While the officer did testify to this effect, he also 
testified regarding his background and exposure to "Cruz" and his 
location when he observed the car. The trial judge implicitly 
found, based on the officer's testimony, that any belief that the 
driver of the car was Jose Cruz was not reasonable and explicitly 
found that the officer relied on erroneous information in forming 
this belief. T. 35-6, 28. 
The trial judge made a written finding that Mr. Lopez had 
not represented himself to the officer as Jose Cruz. R. 28. While 
Officer Hamner testified at one point that Mr. Lopez had introduced 
himself as Jose Cruz, he later clarified that Mr. Lopez had been 
pointed out to him. T. 23, 24. Under such circumstances, a finding 
that Mr. Lopez had not introduced himself to the officer was not 
clearly erroneous. 
The trial judge found that the officer checked out 
whether Jose Cruz had a license based on the officer's thoughts that 
the driver of the vehicle might be involved in drug activity and his 
desire to investigate for drug activity. T. 35-6. 
In addition, the trial judge found that using an 
incorrect name for someone who is driving is an easy way to 
investigate someone for drug activity where an officer wants to do 
such an investigation. T. 36. As the majority acknowledges, the 
subjective intent of the officer is an appropriate circumstance to 
be assessed in considering the totality of the circumstances. 
Lopez. slip op. at 12. 
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The testimony established that the officer recognized the 
car as being in the vicinity of bars where drug activity occurred 
(T. 8, 17, 18) and that the officer was near the bars when he first 
saw the vehicle (T. 19, 22). The officer was parked at night in an 
alley south of 600 South when he first saw the car. T. 19, 22. 
According to the officer, the car moved only about a half block to 
700 South before the officer ran a driver's license check, made the 
decision to pull the car over, and pulled in behind it. T. 19, 21. 
The officer had already made his decision to pull the car over and 
was after the car when he pulled in behind the car prior to its 
making the turn. T. 19. It was at that time, after he was already 
after Mr. Lopez, that the officer claimed that a signal violation 
occurred. T. 19. 
The trial judge's findings coupled with the evidence 
support the trial judge's determination that the stop was a 
pretext. The officer was not able to make a reasonable 
identification of Mr. Lopez as Jose Cruz, and a reasonable officer 
under the circumstances would not have stopped Mr. Lopez but for the 
desire to investigate drug activity. 
The only area in which the trial judge did not make 
explicit findings involves the impact of the claimed turn signal 
violation—whether the officer was actually in a position to see 
such a violation, whether Mr. Lopez actually failed to signal, and 
if a violation occurred, whether it was the type of minor traffic 
violation that a reasonable officer would not have made but for his 
desire to investigate drug activity. However, the officer testified 
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that he was already after Mr. Lopez to effectuate a stop and that 
the claimed turn signal violation was not the basis for the stop. 
In light of the trial judge's ruling, it cannot be 
assumed that the trial judge found that the officer's testimony 
about the alleged turn signal violation was accurate. 
The Lopez majority indicates that this case falls within 
the class of pretext cases in which Ma minor traffic violation or 
the vehicle had a minor equipment problem, but where the court 
concludes that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped 
the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation.11 Lopez. 
slip op. at 5. The reason for this classification is the perception 
that "defendant does not dispute that he failed to signal before 
turning in violation of Utah law." Id. 
On the contrary—Mr. Lopez's motion to suppress 
explicitly states, "there was no reasonable suspicion based on 
objective facts to believe that the Defendant was committing or had 
coiamitted a public offense at the time he was stopped and questioned 
by the officer(s) and . . . the stop was a pretext stop to conduct a 
fishing expedition type search." R. 19. Mr. Lopez's brief also 
argues that Officer Hamner was not credible and that it may well be 
that Officer Hamner, like the officers in Sierra and Arroyo, 
fabricated the alleged traffic offenses to justify the traffic 
stop. Respondent's brief at 34. 
Both Lopez opinions repeatedly note that the evidence all 
came from the testimony of Officer Hamner. Both opinions indicate 
that there is nothing reflecting that the trial court detected a 
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lack of credibility in his testimony, and both opinions state the 
facts as if Officer Hamner's testimony were accurate about 
Mr. Lopez's alleged failure to signal before turning and about 
Officer Hamner's alleged perception that Mr. Lopez was the 
unlicensed Jose Cruz. Lopez, slip op. at 1-2, 11 and n.12, 19, 21 
n.2, 27. 
The fact that all of the evidence came from Hamner is 
irrelevant; in most pretext cases, all of the evidence comes from 
the testimony of officers involved in the stop and the trial judge 
makes findings based on that testimony. In addition, although the 
trial court did not explicitly find that the officer was not telling 
the truth, the determination that the officer's belief that the 
driver was Jose Cruz was incorrect and unreasonable includes an 
implicit determination that at least portions of the officer's 
testimony are not credible. Credibility is not just an assessment 
that the witness is intentionally not telling the truth; it also 
involves an assessment of the foundation for the testimony, the 
witness' ability to perceive, and the reliability of the testimony. 
Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider its assessment of the trial judge's findings and affirm 
the trial judge's order based on an assumption that the trial judge 
made factual findings in accordance with his decision. 
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POINT II. THE BURDEN OF PROOF MUST REMAIN ON 
THE STATE. 
The majority Lopez opinion sets forth the following 
burden of proof rules to apply in pretext cases: 
[T]he State first has the burden to show the 
warrantless traffic stop is lawful. Thus, the 
State must establish that a traffic violation 
occurred in the officer's presence or that the 
officer had probable cause or a reasonable 
suspicion to believe that a traffic violation 
had occurred. Once the State makes this 
showing, the defendant must put forth some 
evidence to support the defendant's claim that 
the stop was a pretext stop. Cf. Marshall, 791 
P.2d at 886 (Party with burden of pleading 
affirmative defense has burden of going forward 
with evidence sufficient to raise issue). 
If the defendant sufficiently raises 
the pretext issue, the burden of proof is then 
ultimately upon the State to show that a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop 
absent the alleged illegal motivation. See, 
e.g., Mann, 712 P.2d at 10 (State must show 
valid legal basis for stop and within exception 
to warrant rule); see also Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 
687-688 (in consent setting, State has burden 
of showing consent was voluntary). 
Lopez, slip op. at 15 (citation omitted; emphasis added). 
The cases cited by this Court in support of its 
imposition of this shifting burden of proof in pretext cases do not 
utilize the burden articulated in Lopez, slip op. at 15-16. 
In State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 887 (Utah 1990), this 
Court required "as part of the State's burden to establish the 
constitutionality of a warrantless search, [the State] must give a 
defendant 'notice that he will be put to his proof' on the fourth 
amendment issue of standing." After the State has given a defendant 
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such notice, the defendant must present facts which show that he has 
standing. 
Requiring a defendant to demonstrate that he or she has 
an expectation of privacy is distinct from requiring an individual 
to demonstrate pretext since standing is a threshold issue which 
must be met before the fourth amendment is implicated, and the 
information required is in the defendant's possession. 
By contrast, in a pretext case, the threshold issue of 
standing has been met and an individual's fourth amendment rights 
are clearly implicated. In addition, the information that this 
Court requires a defendant to present in a pretext case is in the 
hands of the State, not the defendant. 
The only case cited by this Court in the burden of proof 
section which even arguably supports the imposition of this type of 
shifting burden is State v. Mannf 712 P.2d 6, 9 (N.M. App. 1985). 
In Mann, the New Mexico Court of Appeals stated: 
Once a defendant puts in issue facts alleging 
that law enforcement officers stopped his 
vehicle on pretext and conducted a warrantless 
search and seizure, the state has the burden of 
coming forward with the evidence to show that 
there was a valid legal basis for the stop and 
that the search and seizure came within the 
ambit of a recognized exception to the search 
warrant requirements imposed by the fourth 
amendment• 
(emphasis added). 
Although, on the surface, it could be argued that this 
language suggests that the defendant must put on evidence to support 
his claim of pretext, when viewed closely, it appears that the Mann 
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court is actually saying that once a defendant raises the pretext 
issue ("puts in issue facts11), the State has the burden. 
In addition, the burden of proof in a warrantless search 
is not comparable to that of an affirmative defense. See Lopez, 
slip op. at 15. An affirmative defense is a statutorily created 
defense which provides a defendant with a means of absolving himself 
of responsibility. The evidence of the affirmative defense is 
generally accessible to the defendant. 
In the face of an affirmative defense, the State must 
nevertheless establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was 
committed. By contrast, a pretext stop is a fourth amendment 
violation; the well established rule is that the State has the 
burden of establishing the propriety of a warrantless seizure. 
The burden of proof articulated in Lopez is a higher 
standard, placing greater burdens on a criminal defendant, than the 
burden utilized in federal pretext cases. See, e.g., United 
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). 
The shifting burden is also an unworkable burden which 
will cause confusion in the trial courts. Lopez instructs trial 
courts that defendants must "put forth some evidence to support the 
defendant's claim that the stop was pretext." Lopez, slip op. at 
15. It is unclear, however, whether such evidence must be put forth 
after the judge rules on the existence of reasonable suspicion, 
whether it can be put forth through cross-examination of the police 
officers, or whether the defendant must call his or her own 
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witnesses• 
Rarely, if ever, does evidence of a pretext come from the 
defendant or any witness other than the officers who made the stop. 
See generally State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988); 
State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah App. 1990). Furthermore, such 
evidence is generally presented by the State in response to a 
defendant's motion to suppress evidence based on the officer's lack 
of a reasonable articulable suspicion to justify the detention. 
Id. Nevertheless, under the Lopez opinion, a defendant apparently 
must now put forth evidence which may have already been presented by 
the State's witnesses during the reasonable suspicion testimony and 
to which he does not have access. 
Although evidence of pretext is certainly needed to 
establish a pretext stop, the party which puts forth the evidence is 
not determinative. Since a pretext analysis is based on the 
totality of circumstances, shifting burdens and a focus on who 
produces the evidence are irrelevant. Instead of focusing on 
whether a defendant puts forth evidence, the trial judge should look 
to the totality of circumstances, regardless of who presents the 
evidence, to determine whether a pretext stop occurred. See 
State v. Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah App. 1989), overruled on 
other grounds. State v. Arroyo. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)). 
The application of the burden of proof in pretext cases 
is further confused by the last two sentences in the burden of proof 
section in the majority opinion. 
The defendant then may rebut the State's 
showing by identifying facts and circumstances 
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of the stop that demonstrate a reasonable 
officer would not have made the traffic stop 
absent the motivation. A defendant might also 
rebut the State's evidence by introducing 
evidence that other officers normally do not 
5top vqtiipj.es foy the same infraptjops py that 
stopping for such infractions is at odds with 
departmental policy or practice. 
Slip op. at 16 (emphasis added)• 
First, a pretext analysis requires a review of the 
totality of circumstances; it is not an analysis which involves 
"rebutting" the testimony of the State. Second, the first sentence 
suggests that "identifying" or arguing a pretext analysis is 
sufficient to raise the issue. This contrasts with the requirement 
earlier in the opinion that a defendant "put forth" evidence. 
Finally, the second sentence quoted above suggests that the 
defendant put on evidence which is exclusively in the control of the 
State. This contradicts the acknowledgment in footnote 17 that the 
State has the burden of proof because it is more likely to have 
access to the officer's testimony. 
Although the majority acknowledges that the State has 
access to the information and therefore has the ultimate burden (see 
Lopez. slip op. at 15 n.17), the need for the State to carry this 
ultimate burden never arises under Lopez unless the defendant 
presents the evidence to which the State has the natural access. 
Under the shifting burdens outlined in Lopez, the 
defendant carries the heaviest burden to initially introduce 
evidence which is in the custody of the State. This is inconsistent 
with well established law that the State has the burden to justify 
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warrantless seizures. See, e.g.. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 687. 
Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court 
reconsider the imposition of this shifting burden of proof. 
POINT III. THE ROLE OF SUBJECTIVE INTENT NEEDS 
CLARIFICATION. 
Portions of the majority decision in Lopez concerning the 
role of subjective intent are inconsistent with this Court's 
treatment of the trial judge's utilization of the subjective intent 
evidence. The majority appears to be saying that pretext stops must 
be analyzed under an objective standard, but the subjective intent 
of the officer is nevertheless a relevant piece of evidence which 
figures into the objective assessment of the totality of 
circumstances. Lopez, slip op. at 12-14. 
Despite this acknowledgement that evidence of subjective 
intent is a relevant aspect of the totality of circumstances, the 
majority determines that the trial judge "erred in focusing on 
Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in determining the 
officer's stop was a pretext." Lopez, slip op. at 11. 
A review of the trial judge's findings and conclusions 
demonstrates that he made an objective analysis. However, one of 
the circumstances he considered was the subjective intent of the 
officer. Such an approach appears entirely consistent with what a 
portion of the Lopez opinion conveys—that the trial judge must 
utilize an objective standard in assessing whether a pretext stop 
occurred, but the subjective intent of the officer is a relevant 
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circumstance. See Lopez. slip op. at 12, n.14. 
Initially, the majority states that the officer's 
subjective intent is "not the relevant inquiry" and not a "key 
factor." Lopez at 9. Then, the majority indicates that the 
officer's subjective intent is a relevant factor in the objective 
assessment of all facts and circumstances in the reasonable 
hypothetical officer scenario. Lopez at 12 and n.14. 
Next, in footnotes 15 and 16, the majority cites with 
approval three cases which appear to turn on the officers' 
subjective intent, or "illegal motivation." Finally, in 
footnote 18, the majority explains that while the pretext doctrine 
is difficult to apply, it is appropriately considered only in rare 
cases, some of "which often involve a clear admission by the officer 
that the stop was not made for the cited violation but because of a 
hunch that a more serious criminal activity was involved" (emphasis 
added)• 
In short, in pretext cases, the subjective intent of the 
officer is one critical factor among many in the application of the 
reasonable hypothetical officer test. Or, in the words of Lopez, 
"The fundamental rule is that a trial court may look to all facts 
and circumstances surrounding the traffic stop to determine if a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the illegal 
motivation." Lopez at 12 (emphasis by the court deleted, emphasis 
added by counsel). This Court misapplied the law in determining 
that the trial judge erred in focusing on this piece of evidence in 
reaching his conclusion. 
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CONCLUSION 
Mr. Lopez respectfully requests that this Court rehear 
the issues set forth herein. 
DATED this  3o day of March, 1992. 
JAMES A. VALDEZ 
Attorney for Petitioner 
a 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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ADDENDUM A 
This opinion is subject to revision before flf|/\R 9 1992 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. ~ j rf 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS * W -
o o 0 o o . Clerk o/.h.-Oc-urt 
S t a t e of Utah, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Gerard Cotero J. Lopez, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
Third District, Salt Lake County 
The Honorable David S. Young 
OPINION 
(For Publication) 
Case No. 900484-CA 
F I L E D 
(March 2 , 1992) 
Attorneys: R. Paul Van Dam and David B. Thompson, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellant 
James A. Valdez and Elizabeth Holbrook, Salt Lake 
City, for Appellee 
Before Judges Billings, Orme, and Russon. 
BILLINGS, Associate Presiding Judge: 
The State of Utah filed this interlocutory appeal from an 
order granting defendant Gerard Lopez's motion to suppress 
evidence obtained as a result of a police traffic stop and 
subsequent inventory search of defendant's vehicle. On appeal, 
the State argues the trial court erred in: (1) determining the 
police officer did not have a reasonable suspicion to believe the 
driver was driving without a license, and (2) determining the 
stop was a pretext stop. We reverse and remand. 
I. FACTS 
The question of whether a warrantless police traffic stop 
violates the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution 
is particularly fact sensitive and, thus, we review the 
underlying facts of this case in detail. State v. Smith, 781 
P.2d 879, 880 (Utah App. 1989); State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 
973 (Utah App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990). The arresting officer was the only 
witness called during the suppression hearing, and the facts are 
therefore largely based upon his testimony. 
At 9:00 p.m. on June 19, 1990, Officer Hamner was patrolling 
in his police car. Officer Hamner saw defendant's vehicle 
traveling southbound on 400 East in Salt Lake City, and 
recognized the vehicle as one he had seen on several occasions 
near two local bars known for criminal activity, including 
illegal drug use. Officer Hamner believed the vehicle belonged 
to Jose Cruz, and after observing the driver of the car, believed 
the driver was Cruz. Officer Hamner recognized Cruz from his 
undercover operations in the area approximately nine months 
earlier. During this period, individuals had pointed out Cruz to 
Officer Hamner and indicated Cruz was a drug dealer. The 
individual Officer Hamner believed to be Cruz had also introduced 
himself to Officer Hamner. Further, Officer Hamner had seen 
photographs of Cruz during his work with the Metro Narcotics 
Strike Force. 
Because Cruz did not have a valid driver's license nine 
months earlier, Officer Hamner called police dispatch to see if 
Cruz had a license. The radio operator informed Officer Hamner 
that there was no record of Jose Cruz having a driver's license. 
Officer Hamner then observed defendant turn onto 700 South 
without signaling. Officer Hamner pulled defendant over and 
asked to see his driver's license. Although Officer Hamner 
admitted he suspected defendant had been involved with drugs, he 
testified that he stopped defendant for driving without a license 
and failing to signal. Defendant was unable to produce a 
driver's license but did give Officer Hamner an identification 
card indicating he was "Geraldo Lopez." Officer Hamner then did 
a warrants check on defendant under the name of Lopez which 
revealed three outstanding warrants. Officer Hamner placed 
defendant under arrest and cited defendant for driving without a 
license and failing to signal before turning. Officer Hamner 
impounded defendant's car and during an inventory search, he and 
another officer discovered several bags of cocaine. 
Defendant was charged with one count of unlawful possession 
of a controlled substance with intent to distribute, a second-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. section 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1990). Defendant filed a motion to suppress 
the evidence seized during the search of his car. Relying on 
this court's opinion in Sierra. 754 P.2d 972, the trial court 
concluded Officer Hamner's stop of defendant was an 
unconstitutional "pretext•• stop, and ordered the evidence seized 
by Officer Hamner suppressed. Following the trial court's 
suppression ruling, the State petitioned for interlocutory review 
of the trial court's ruling, which we granted. 
c nr\£? £-r>z 
II. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILE STOPS 
In considering a motion to suppress, we review a trial 
court's underlying factual findings under a "clearly erroneous" 
standard. State v. Smith. 781 P.2d at 881; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 
974. However, we review the trial court's ultimate legal 
conclusions flowing from these factual findings under a 
"correctness" standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 
(Utah App. 1991). 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
secures the right of individuals to be free from unreasonable 
searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but 
upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the 
place to be searched, and the persons or 
things to be seized. 
U.S. Const, amend IV.1 
The Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches 
and seizures extends to automobiles. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 653, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 1396 (1979); State v. Schlosser, 
774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 1989); see State v. Grovier. 808 P.2d 
133, 13 5 (Utah App. 1991). "The Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments 
are implicated . . . because stopping an automobile and detaining 
its occupants constitute a * seizure' within the meaning of those 
Amendments, even though the purpose of the stop is limited and 
the resulting detention quite brief." Prouse, 440 U.S. at 653, 
99 S. Ct. at 1396. Thus, the Fourth Amendment prohibits police 
officers from randomly or arbitrarily stopping vehicles on the 
highway. See id. at 654-56, 99 S. Ct. at 1396-98. Among the 
situations that courts have identified where a police officer is 
1. Although on appeal defendant claims Officer Hamner violated 
his rights under both the federal Constitution and Article I, 
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution, defendant offers no argument 
that our judgment or analysis should differ under these two 
provisions. We thus limit our analysis to the Fourth Amendment 
and make no comment concerning the search and seizure provisions 
of the Utah Constitution and pretext stops. See generally State 
v. Larocco, 794 P.2d 460, 465 (Utah 1990)(plurality)(analyzing 
Utah Constitution "search and seizure" provision where analysis 
under federal Constitution may differ). 
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justified in stopping a vehicle are: (1) When the officer 
observes the driver commit a traffic violation; e.g., State v. 
Smith. 781 P.2d at 882-83; Kehoe v. State. 521 So. 2d 1094, 1095-
96 (Fla. 1988) ; (2) when the officer has a reasonable articulable 
suspicion that the driver is committing a traffic offense, such 
as driving under the influence of alcohol or driving without a 
license; e.g.. Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135; State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 
1214, 1216 (Utah App. 1988); and (3) when the officer has a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that the driver is engaged in 
more serious criminal activity, such as transporting drugs; e.g., 
United States v, Lvles, 946 F.2d 78, 81 (8th Cir. 1991); United 
States v, Morgan. 936 F.2d 1561, 1567 (10th Cir. 1991); Sierra. 
754 P.2d at 975. 
The issues presented at the suppression hearing and now on 
appeal pertain to the first two categories outlined above. The 
State contends Officer Hamner was justified in stopping defendant 
.because defendant had committed a traffic violation by failing to 
signal before turning, and the officer had reason to believe 
defendant was driving without a license. Alternatively, the 
State argues the case should be remanded because of insufficient 
findings under both these issues and because the trial court 
incorrectly applied the pretext doctrine. We agree with the 
State that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard when 
holding Officer Hamner's traffic stop was a pretext stop. We 
also agree that the court's findings of fact were inadequate with 
regard to both the pretext stop and whether Officer Hamner had a 
reasonable suspicion that defendant was driving without a 
license. We therefore reverse and remand. Because we reverse 
and remand for a fresh analysis of the legality of the traffic 
stop, we do not reach the issue of the legality of the subsequent 
detention. 
III. PRETEXT TRAFFIC STOP 
A. When the Pretext Doctrine Applies 
In recent years, this court has joined other courts in 
construing the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment2 by 
adopting what we now commonly refer to as the "pretext doctrine." 
See, e.g., Grovier, 808 P.2d at 135-37; State v. Marshall, 791 
P.2d 880, 882-83 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 
2. We have never expressly considered whether the pretext 
doctrine is also rooted in Article I, Section 14 of the Utah 
Constitution. There is, however, no reason to believe at least 
the same protections are not afforded under our state 
constitution. 
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1990); Baird, 763 P.2d at 1216-17; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-80; 
see also United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1518-19 (10th 
Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 
1986) ; sources cited in footnote eight. In Utah, the pretext 
doctrine applies in cases where an officer claims to have stopped 
a vehicle for a minor traffic violation, but where the court 
determines the stop was not made because of the traffic violation 
but rather due to an unconstitutional motivation and, therefore, 
the officer has deviated from the normal course of action 
expected of a reasonable officer.3 Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. 
We have articulated the pretext doctrine as whether a "reasonable 
. . . officer, in view of the totality of the circumstances 
confronting him or her, would have stopped" the vehicle for the 
traffic violation absent the unconstitutional motivation. Id. 
Whether a traffic stop was an unconstitutional "pretext" 
stop requires a legal conclusion—thus we review it for 
"correctness." Steward, 806 P.2d at 215; State v. Palmer, 803 
P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1990), cert, denied, 815 P.2d 241 
(Utah 1991) .4 
This court has utilized the "pretext" doctrine in two 
distinct situations. First, we have applied it where the facts 
demonstrated the driver did not commit a traffic violation.5 
Baird, 763 P.2d at 1217; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979. The second 
situation is where the driver committed a minor traffic violation 
or the vehicle had a minor equipment problem, but where the court 
concludes that a reasonable police officer would not have stopped 
the vehicle absent the unconstitutional motivation. See, e.g., 
State v. Smith, 781 P.2d at 883; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097. 
Because defendant does not dispute that he failed to signal 
before turning in violation of Utah law, we address the second 
variation of the pretext doctrine, i.e., where a traffic 
violation has occurred. 
3. We have also referred to this standard as the "hypothetical 
reasonable officer" standard. See Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78. 
4. See generally State v. Vigil, 815 P.2d 1296, 1298-1301 (Utah 
App. 1991)(discussing in some detail bifurcated standard of 
review applied to mixed questions of fact and law in Fourth 
Amendment context). 
5. There is little question that under these circumstances a 
traffic stop is unconstitutional. Judge Russon's dissenting 
opinion would recognize such stops as unconstitutional. 
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B. Reasons for the Pretext Doctrine 
Because Judge Russon in his dissent has chosen to follow the 
State's plea that we abandon the pretext doctrine, we reexamine 
the underlying policies that persuaded us to adopt the doctrine 
in the first instance.6 
The adoption of the pretext doctrine is consistent with 
existing legal authority. Although the United States Supreme 
Court has yet to address the pretext doctrine, a number of 
federal circuit courts have approved the doctrine. See Guzman, 
864 F.2d at 1515; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 710-11.7 
In 1990, the Utah Supreme Court, by implication, ratified our 
application of the pretext doctrine in State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 
684, 688 (Utah 1990). There, the Utah Supreme Court reached the 
issue of whether a voluntary consent which occurred after a 
pretextual traffic stop was sufficiently attenuated from the 
prior illegal pretext stop to allow the consent to validate the 
warrantless search. If the Arroyo court disapproved of the 
pretext doctrine, logic suggests the court would have rejected 
the doctrine and reversed this court without ever reaching the 
attenuation-consent issue. In fact, the Arrovo court referred to 
our pretext holding with approval: 
[t]he court of appeals agreed [with the lower 
court's pretext finding], stating that under 
the totality of the circumstances, "a 
reasonable officer would not have stopped 
Arroyo and cited him for * following too 
closely' except for some unarticulated 
6. Apart from Judge Russon's dissent in this case, every other 
judge on the Utah Court of Appeals has cited the pretext doctrine 
with approval. See State v. Lovegren. 798 P.2d 767, 770 n.10 
(Utah App. 1990)(Bench, Davidson, and Orme, J.J.); State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d at 883 (Bench, Billings, Orme, J.J.); State v. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1990)(Billings, Davidson, 
and Jackson, J.J.); State v. Arroyo. 770 P.2d 153, 154 (Utah App. 
1989), rev'd on other grounds. 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990) 
(Billings, Bench, and Garff, J.J.); State v. Talbot. 792 P.2d 
489, 491-92 (Utah App. 1990)(Billings, Greenwood, and Orme, 
J.J.); Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977-78 (Billings, Bench, and Jackson, 
J.J.). 
7. But see United States v. Trigg. 925 F.2d 1064, 1065 (7th 
Cir.)(rejecting pretext doctrine), cert, denied sub nom.. Cummins 
v. United States, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991); United 
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498, 500 (8th Cir. 1990)(same), cert, 
denied, U.S. , 112 S. Ct. 428 (1991). 
5 
suspicion of more serious criminal activity." 
The trial court and the court of appeals were 
clearly correct on [the pretext] issue— 
Trooper Mangelson's stop was an 
unconstitutional pretext. 
Id. (emphasis added, citations omitted). Additionally, the 
majority of other states which have considered the issue have 
adopted the pretext doctrine.8 
We are persuaded the pretext doctrine is necessary to 
prevent the abuse of various exceptions to the Fourth Amendment's 
warrant requirement. See United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037 
(7th Cir. 1989) . Furthermore, the doctrine protects citizens 
from arbitrary activity by police officers and supports the 
Fourth Amendment's requirement of objective reasonableness to 
support any invasion by law enforcement. See Maryland v. Macon, 
472 U.S. 463, 470-71, 105 S. Ct. 2778, 2783 (1985); Scott v. 
United States. 436 U.S. 128, 137-38, 98 S. Ct. 1717, 1723 (1978). 
Finally, the pretext doctrine requires courts to focus on the 
realities of police practices—not pretenses—thus protecting the 
integrity of the courts. See United States v, Keller, 499 F. 
Supp. 415, 418 (N.D. 111. 1980); Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 689. 
There can be little dispute that in our society, minor 
traffic and equipment violations are pervasive. See Sierra, 754 
P.2d at 978-79 (quoting 5 W. Lafave, Search and Seizure § 5.2(e) 
(2d ed. 1987)); Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097. Allowing police 
officers to stop vehicles for any minor violation when the 
officer in fact is pursuing a hunch would allow officers to seize 
almost any individual on the basis of otherwise unconstitutional 
objectives. Such unfettered discretion offends the Fourth 
Amendment. See Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 
1879 (1968); United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d at 711. 
Further, allowing police officers to make pretext stops 
implicates equal protection concerns and policies. We cannot 
ignore the reality that many pretext stop cases involve 
minorities and that in some cases one of the articulated reasons 
8. See New York v. Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223, 
224, appeal denied, 573 N.Y.S.2d 649, 578 N.E.2d 447 (1991); 
Tarwid v. Georgia, 184 Ga. App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63, 64-65 (App. 
1987); Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1096; Illinois v. Guerrieri, 194 111. 
App. 3d 497, 501, 551 N.E.2d 767, 770, appeal denied, 132 111. 2d 
549, 555 N.E.2d 380 (1990); North Carolina v. Morocco, 99 N.C. 
App. 421, 427, 393 S.E.2d 545, 548 (1990). But see State v, 
Olaiz, 100 Or. App. 380, 786 P.2d 734, 736, appeal denied, 310 
Or. 122, 794 P.2d 793 (1990)(rejecting pretext doctrine). 
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for the stop was that the occupants were Hispanic.9 We are 
mindful that law enforcement officials often use racial 
characteristics as a basis for "hunch" criminal profiles in 
pretextual traffic stops. Cf. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 
at 711 (pretext stop occurring during officers use of drug 
courier profile). Courts have consistently held these profiling 
techniques unconstitutional where they are the sole basis for 
making a traffic stop.10 To permit police officers to use any 
minor traffic violation as a pretext to stop a vehicle encourages 
the selective enforcement of traffic regulations against 
minorities or "suspicious" classes, such as those with an 
unorthodox appearance or out-of-state license plates. 
Accordingly, in addition to Fourth Amendment concerns, equal 
protection policies constrain us to uphold the pretext doctrine. 
Our colleague in dissent criticizes the pretext doctrine, 
claiming the doctrine invades the province of the legislature. 
We disagree. The pretext doctrine does not restrict the state 
legislature from enacting traffic regulations, nor does it 
facially invalidate any traffic regulation. Rather, the pretext 
9. Numerous federal and state cases dealing with a pretext stop 
question have involved vehicle occupants of Hispanic or African-
American descent. See, e.g.. United States v. Ouinones-Sandoval. 
943 F.2d 771, 774 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rivera. 906 
F.2d 319, 322 n.l (7th Cir. 1990); United States v. Lavmon. 730 
F. Supp. 332, 339 (D. Colo. 1990); United States v. Suarez. 694 
F. Supp. 926, 931 (S.D. Ga. 1988), aff'd. 885 F.2d 1574 (11th 
Cir. 1989); Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687 n.3; Limonia v. Commonwealth, 
7 Va. App. 416, 419, 375 S.E.2d 12, 13 (1988), on rehearing. 8 
Va. App. 532, 383 S.E.2d 476 (1989), cert, denied. U.S. , 
110 S. Ct. 1925 (1990). 
10. See, e.g.. Lavmon. 730 F. Supp. at 339 (use of drug profile 
to make traffic drug stop unconstitutional where evidence showed 
stop was based on race of defendants); Lowrev v. Commonwealth. 9 
Va. App. 314, 388 S.E.2d 265, 267 (1990)(defendants race 
impermissible factor in traffic stop where driver matched drug 
courier profile); see also State v. Shamblin. 763 P.2d 425, 428 
(Utah App. 1988)(eschewing procedure that would permit selective 
enforcement in favor of one that promotes "a certain equality of 
treatment"); Comment, The Use of the Drug Courier Profile in 
Traffic Stops: Valid Police Practice or Fourth Amendment 
Violation?. 15 Ohio N.U.L. Rev. 593, passim (1988) (use of drug 
courier profiles in making traffic stops may violate Fourth 
Amendment); Note, The Drug Courier Profile and Airport Stops: 
Reasonable Intrusions or Suspicionless Seizures?. 12 Nova L. Rev. 
273, 295-96 (1987)(drug courier profiles are susceptible to 
racial abuse and implicate Fourth Amendment concerns). 
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doctrine restricts police discretion when used 
unconstitutionally. Long ago the United States Supreme Court 
recognized that a facially constitutional statute may become 
unconstitutional when selectively and arbitrarily enforced on a 
suspect class. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins. 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 
1064, 1073 (1886)(valid statute applied unconstitutionally where 
evidence showed administrative body granted or denied statutory 
licenses based on race of applicant). 
Accordingly, we reaffirm our adoption of the pretext 
doctrine. It protects the privacy of all individuals by 
requiring that police be consistent in their enforcement of 
traffic regulations and prevents police from conducting 
warrantless searches and seizures based on an otherwise 
insufficient hunch of more serious criminal activity. 
C. The Reasonable Officer Standard 
On appeal, the State asserts the trial court improperly 
focused on Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in its 
pretext analysis. We agree. 
In Sierra, we stated a court should make an "objective 
assessment of the officer's actions in light of the facts and 
circumstances confronting [the officer] at the time." 754 P.2d 
at 977. We emphasized that the proper inquiry is "whether a . . 
. reasonable officer . . . would have stopped" the defendant 
solely for commission of the traffic offense. Id. at 978; see 
also Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1517; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 
at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1097. "The proper inquiry does 
not focus on whether the officer could validly have made the 
stop." Sierra. 754 P.2d at 978. 
Further, we clearly indicated that the officer's subjective 
motivation is not the relevant inquiry. Id. at 977. Were the 
officer's subjective motivation the key factor, a defendant could 
use this improper motivation as an excuse to escape the 
consequences of an otherwise valid and reasonable stop.11 The 
Fourth Amendment's protection from unreasonable searches and 
seizures is primarily grounded in protecting an individual's 
reasonable expectation of privacy. See California v. Ciraolo. 
476 U.S. 207, 211, 106 S. Ct. 1809, 1811 (1986). An individual 
11. The reasonable officer standard is well entrenched as the 
proper standard under the pretext doctrine. See Guzman. 864 F.2d 
at 1515-16; Smith. 799 F.2d at 708; Kehoe, 521 So. 2d at 1096; 
Grovier. 808 P.2d at 135; Baird. 763 P.2d at 1216; Marshall, 791 
P.2d at 882-83; Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977-80. 
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does not have a reasonable expectation that the police will not 
make a traffic stop when the individual commits a traffic 
violation the police regularly enforce. Thus, if a driver is 
stopped for traveling at eighty miles an hour in a school zone or 
running a red light—traffic offenses all drivers know the police 
regularly enforce—the driver does not have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy. In this circumstance, the driver should 
not be able to avoid a stop simply because the police officer 
also subjectively believed the driver might be transporting drugs 
as such a stop is not "unexpected" or "arbitrary." See United 
States v. Mendenhall. 446 U.S. 544, 553-54, 100 S. Ct. 1870 
(1980). 
Thus, the issue of whether a traffic stop is a pretext stop 
cannot turn on the issue of an officer's subjective intent, but 
rather, must turn on the objective question of whether a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop under the same 
circumstances absent the illegal motivation. Sierra, 754 P.2d at 
977-78; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d at 710-11; Kehoe, 521 
So. 2d at 1097. 
"[A] stop [i]s unreasonable not because the 
officer secretly hope[s] to find evidence of 
a greater offense, but because it [i]s clear 
that an officer would have been uninterested 
in pursuing the lesser offense absent that 
hope." In other words, "the proper basis of 
concern is not with why the officer deviated 
from the usual practice in this case but 
simply that he did deviate." 
Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1517 (quoting United States v. Smith, 799 
F.2d at 709 and 1 W. Lafave, Searches and Seizures § 1.4(e) at 
94) . 
Further, a focus on an individual officer's subjective 
intent as the measure of whether a stop is a pretext would 
violate the United States Supreme Court's ruling that the Fourth 
Amendment mandates an objective inquiry into police activity. 
Macon. 472 U.S. at 470-71, 105 S. Ct. at 2783; Scott, 436 U.S. at 
137-38, 98 S. Ct. at 1223. 
In making its suppression ruling, the trial court set forth 
its findings of fact which included, inter alia, the following: 
Officer Hamner observed defendant make a left 
turn and says he did not see a signal at 
which time a stop was made; 
rtnn / ?> / _ " ? 
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xne underlying motivation for the stop was to 
search for drugs and all conclusions as to 
the identity of Mr. Lopez as Jose Cruz were 
erroneous. 
The trial court's conclusions of law included the following: 
The underlying motivation [was] to follow and 
to stop the search for drugs; 
The stop was a "pretext stop" the subsequent 
search of the car and seizure of the 
contraband also violated Mr. Lopez's state 
and federal constitutional rights against 
unreasonable searches and seizures. 
In its cursory findings and conclusions, the trial court 
erred in focusing on Officer Hamner's subjective state of mind in 
determining the officer's stop was a pretext stop. The court 
also failed to address many relevant uncontested facts. The 
officer testified he stopped defendant's car because he believed 
defendant was Cruz, believed defendant was driving without a 
license and because he saw defendant make a turn without 
signaling. The officer further testified that he routinely 
issues citations for failure to signal—writing about seven 
tickets per month. He stated he always stops vehicles where he 
believes the driver is driving without a license unless he is on 
a high priority call. There was no contrary evidence as to what 
Officer Hamner routinely did, nor any evidence suggesting that 
what he routinely did was at odds with what a reasonable officer 
would do. The court further did not comment on the officer's 
credibility as to his claimed reasons for the stop in this 
instance. The court's only relevant findings were that the 
driver made a turn without signaling and "the underlying 
motivation for the stop was to search for drugs." The trial 
court incorrectly focused on the officer's subjective motivation 
while ignoring whether the officer would have made the stop 
regardless of that motivation. Accordingly, we reverse the trial 
court's determination that the stop was a pretext stop and remand 
the case for the trial court to apply the proper legal standard 
and to make relevant findings of fact necessary to apply that 
standard.n 
12. The facts in the record are undisputed as only Officer 
Hamner testified. The trial court intimated nothing which would 
suggest the court found the testimony not credible. In such 
situations, this court would ordinarily apply the undisputed 
facts and determine the proper result without the need for 
remand. See. e.q,t Lovegren, 798 P.2d 767, 771 & n.10. We 
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D. Relevant Evidence 
Because we are remanding the case for a further evaluation 
under the reasonable officer standard, we comment on the type of 
evidence that is relevant to determine what a reasonable officer 
would do under the same circumstances.13 The fundamental rule is 
that a trial court may look to all facts and circumstances 
surrounding the traffic stop to determine if a reasonable officer 
would have made the stop absent the illegal motivation. See, 
e.g. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978. 
Although the pretext question does not turn on the arresting 
officer's subjective motivation, a trial court may consider the 
officer's testimony as to why the officer stopped the car and 
whether such stop is consistent with his usual practice. Also 
relevant are the objective facts and circumstances preceding the 
stop. The involved officer's actions are neither irrelevant nor 
-determinative as to what a reasonable officer would do under the 
circumstances.M 
refrain from doing so here because the scope of the evidentiary 
hearing and its focus on Officer Hamner's subjective motives were 
products of confusion as to the proper analysis under the pretext 
doctrine—which we hope is clarified by this opinion. Therefore, 
we remand to allow the opportunity for the introduction of 
additional evidence, if necessary, and to allow the necessary 
findings for application of the pretext doctrine. 
13. On appeal, the State points out that several of our prior 
opinions may be confusing to practitioners and courts attempting 
to apply the standard, and has requested that we clarify what 
evidence is relevant to a pretext inquiry to assist the trial 
court on remand. 
14. Although we have previously stated an officer's subjective 
motivation is irrelevant, Sierra. 754 P.2d at 977, this statement 
does not preclude introduction of evidence relating to an 
officer's reason for the stop during a suppression hearing. In 
Sierra, this court correctly observed an officer's subjective 
intent is not the relevant legal standard or inquiry a court 
should use to determine if a stop is pretextual in violation of 
the Fourth Amendment. However, this statement was not made in 
the context of what evidence may be relevant to what a reasonable 
officer would do under the circumstances. Thus, Sierra does not 
require courts to exclude evidence of an officer's subjective 
intent. It merely establishes the pretext doctrine as an 
objective legal standard. 
In United States v. Smith, the court explained: 
In determining the validity of the stop of 
[defendants] automobile by [the officer], we 
therefore are not concerned with [the 
officer's] subjective intent. His actions 
and his description of the circumstances 
surrounding the stop are, however, relevant 
to our inquiry. Thus, while [the officer's] 
courtroom declaration of motive is 
intriguing, what turns this case is the 
overwhelming objective evidence that [the 
officer] had no interest in investigating 
possible drunk driving charges: he began 
pursuit before he observed any "weaving" and, 
even after he stopped the car, he made no 
investigation of the possibility of 
intoxication. That he described the vehicle 
as being driven with an abundance of caution 
further indicates that the stop was unrelated 
to any possible concern with traffic safety. 
Based on this objective evidence, we conclude 
that a reasonable officer would not have 
stopped the car absent an additional, invalid 
purpose. 
799 F.2d at 710-11. 
This court has repeatedly looked to the circumstances 
surrounding the stop in deciding whether the officer involved 
would have stopped the car for the traffic violation absent the 
unconstitutional motivation. The evidence is not determinative— 
as the relevant legal inquiry is whether a reasonable officer 
would have stopped the vehicle absent the unconstitutional 
motivation. However, the evidence is probative of the inquiry as 
the officer involved is within the class of competent witnesses. 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 979-80.l5 Utah courts have never excluded 
15. In Sierra we said "[o]ur conclusion that a reasonable 
officer would not have stopped Sierra for traveling in the left 
lane is buttressed by the events preceding [the officer's] 
seizure of Sierra's automobile. . . . Officer Smith was 
suspicious of Sierra before he observed Sierra commit any 
purported traffic violation. He had radioed for a computer check 
of the car's license plate but found it was not stolen. 
Nevertheless, he radioed for back-up assistance and exceeded the 
posted speed limit to catch Sierra." Sierra. 754 P.2d at 979-80; 
see also Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687 n.3 (Trooper Mangelson did not 
stop Arroyo until he pulled along side and observed the occupants 
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evidence of the involved officer's expressed reason for the stop 
nor the facts and circumstances surrounding the stop in 
evaluating the reasonable officer standard.16 Certainly the 
conduct of the officer involved is some evidence of what the 
objective reasonable officer would have done, especially if it is 
coupled with an indication by the officer as to whether the 
conduct is consistent at least with his own practice. Simply 
put, if an officer testifies to routinely making stops for a 
particular offense, it tends to show the stop was objectively 
reasonable; if the officer admits to having never before stopped 
a driver for the offense, it tends to show a reasonable officer 
would not have made the stop. 
In addition to evaluating the facts and circumstances 
surrounding the traffic stop, a trial court may also properly 
consider evidence of the normal practices of other police 
officers under similar circumstances, as well as indications of 
departmental policy. The reasonable officer inquiry considers 
all relevant facts and circumstances probative of whether a 
reasonable officer would have made the traffic stop absent the 
illegal motivation. 
were Hispanic). In Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, we recognized that, 
"unlike the officer in Sierra, [the officer here] was not 
suspicious of [the defendant] for other reasons before the stop, 
had not followed him in order to find some reason to pull him 
over, and, before the alleged violation occurred, had not radioed 
for help thereby indicating he intended to stop the vehicle." 
Id. at 883. 
16. The Utah Supreme Court in approving the pretext doctrine in 
Arroyo also referred to the facts and circumstances surrounding 
the stop and the officer's motivations. The Arrovo court stated: 
[t]he following findings of fact justify the 
conclusion the stop was a pretext: 
"8. As a result [of] Trooper Mangelson's 
training at [a] seminar, he admitted that 
whenever he observed an Hispanic individual 
driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the 
vehicle. The Trooper also admitted that once 
he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the 
time he requested permission to search the 
vehicle." 
Arrovo, 796 P.2d at 688 n.3. 
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E. Burden of Proof 
Both the State and defendant seek a clarification of the 
burden of going forward and the burden of proof in a pretext stop 
suppression hearing. When a search or seizure is made without a 
warrant, the burden is, in the first instance, upon the State to 
show the warrantless search meets an exception to the warrant 
rule. Id. at 886-87; New Mexico v. Mann. 103 N.M. 660, 712 P.2d 
6, 10 (Ct. App. 1985), cert, denied. 103 N.M. 740, 713 P.2d 556 
(1986). 
In the pretext stop setting, this means the State first has 
the burden to show the warrantless traffic stop is lawful. Thus, 
the State must establish that a traffic violation occurred in the 
officer's presence or that the officer had probable cause or a 
reasonable suspicion to believe that a traffic violation had 
occurred. Cf. United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d at 709 ("weaving11 
not a violation of Florida law). Once the State makes this 
showing, the defendant must put forth some evidence to support 
the defendant's claim that the stop was a pretext stop. Cf. 
Marshall. 791 P.2d at 886 (party with burden of pleading 
affirmative defense has burden of going forward with evidence 
sufficient to raise issue). 
If the defendant sufficiently raises the pretext issue, the 
burden of proof is then ultimately upon the State to show that a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop absent the alleged 
illegal motivation.17 See, e.g. . Mann. 712 P.2d at 10 (State 
must show valid legal basis for stop and within exception to 
warrant rule); see also Arroyo. 796 P.2d at 687-88 (in consent 
setting, State has burden of showing consent was voluntary). 
The State may easily meet its burden by introducing the 
testimony of the arresting officers justifications for the 
actual stop and the officer's normal practices. Absent some 
17* The ultimate burden of proof is properly on the State for 
several reasons. First, because the seizure was conducted 
without a warrant, the State should bear the burden of showing 
the stop was not an intrusion on the defendant's reasonable 
expectation of privacy, including a showing of what a reasonable 
officer would do under the same circumstances. See Arroyo, 796 
P.2d at 695. Additionally, because the State has the primary 
access to most of the relevant evidence, including the officer's 
past stop practices and the practices of other officers, we 
believe the burden of proof is properly placed on the State. 
See, e.g., Staheli v. Farmers' Coop.. 655 P.2d 680, 683 (Utah 
1982)(burden of proof lies with party most likely to have access 
to evidence). 
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concession that the stop was outside normal practice, this may be 
all that is necessary. See, e.g.. Lovearen, 798 P.2d at 771. 
The defendant then may rebut the State's showing by identifying 
facts and circumstances of the stop that demonstrate a reasonable 
officer would not have made the traffic stop absent the 
unconstitutional motivation. A defendant might also rebut the 
State's evidence by introducing evidence that other officers 
normally do not stop vehicles for the same infractions or that 
stopping for such infractions is at odds with departmental policy 
or practice.18 
IV. INADEQUATE FINDINGS OF FACT ON REASONABLE SUSPICION 
In addition to its pretext arguments, the State also argues 
the trial court's findings of fact were inadequate as to whether 
Officer Hamner had a reasonable suspicion that defendant was 
driving without a license. We agree. Initially, we note that 
the trial court's findings were very brief and did not set out 
the circumstances of the stop of defendant's car. More 
18. We concede that the pretext doctrine complicates matters for 
trial counsel and trial courts. However, the effort is justified 
by the important constitutional principles involved. See I.N.S. 
v. Chadha. 462 U.S. 919, 944, 103 S. Ct. 2764, 2781 (1983) ("the 
fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and 
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, 
will not save it if it is contrary to the Constitution"). 
Furthermore, the doctrine will be rarely applied if properly 
used. Only a small minority of traffic stop cases implicate the 
pretext doctrine when the focus is on "whether a reasonable 
officer would have made the stop absent the illegal motivation." 
In clear-cut cases, as mentioned earlier, of driving eighty 
miles-per-hour in a school zone or consuming alcohol while 
driving, common knowledge suggests that reasonable officers 
everywhere routinely stop such offenders. In such cases, the 
pretext doctrine cannot be asserted in good faith and can be 
dismissed quickly by trial judges. 
The pretext doctrine has been applied only to the unusual 
stop where discretion is broad, such as weaving or following too 
closely or a minor equipment problem. The cases often involve a 
clear admission by the officer that the stop was not made for the 
cited violation but because of a hunch that more serious criminal 
activity was involved. See, e.g., Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 and 
n.3; Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977; see also State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 
181 (Utah 1987)("erratic" driving with police tailing 
insufficient to support reasonable suspicion); Baird, 763 P.2d at 
1217; Guzman. 864 F.2d at 1518; United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 
at 706. 
C ^ C, L 7-
importantly, the findings do not clearly establish how Officer 
Hamner arrived at the suspicion that defendant was driving 
without a license, and are particularly confusing in describing 
the relationship between Cruz and Lopez—including whether 
Officer Hamner had ever been introduced to defendant under any 
name. The trial court's only finding of fact with regard to this 
issue stated: "[A]11 conclusions as to the identity of Mr. Lopez 
as Jose Cruz were erroneous." With no other findings on the 
relationship between Lopez and Cruz, we are unable to evaluate 
whether the court's conclusion that there was no reasonable 
suspicion to stop defendant for driving without a license was in 
error. See State v. Lovecrren. 798 P.2d 767, 111 (Utah App. 
1990). Accordingly, on remand, the trial court should more fully 
explain the factual basis for its conclusion regarding reasonable 
suspicion. 
CONCLUSION 
We reverse the trial court's conclusion that Officer 
Hamner's stop of defendant for failing to signal was a pretext 
stop on the ground that the trial court applied an improper legal 
analysis under the pretext doctrine and therefore made inadequate 
findings of fact. We also remand the case for further findings 
of fact and conclusions of law concerning whether Officer Hamner 
had a reasonable suspicion to believe defendant was driving 
without a license. 
Judith M. Billings, 
Associate Presiding Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Gregor^K. Orme, Judged 
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RUSSON, Judge (concurring in part and dissenting in part): 
Although I concur that this case must be reversed and 
remanded, I dissent (1) from the majority's analysis used in 
reaching that result and (2) from the majority's instructions 
upon remand that the trial court should reanalyze the evidence 
and issue a revised order on Lopez's motion to suppress. I would 
reverse and remand this case for trial in which the evidence in 
question would be admitted. 
On appeal, the State has invited us to reconsider the 
pretext analysis first set forth in State v. Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 
(Utah App. 1988), disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arrovo, 
796 P.2d 684, 689-92 (Utah 1990). Upon that invitation, I would 
recommend a return to the basic analysis of the legality of 
seizures established in Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 88 S. Ct. 1868 
(1968), and Delaware v. Prouse. 440 U.S. 648, 99 S. Ct. 1391 
(1979) for most traffic stop cases, limiting the use of Sierra to 
the narrow group of cases to which pretext analysis properly 
applies. Accordingly, I would hold that the following is the 
proper, and more prudent, analysis. 
I. THE FOURTH AMENDMENT AND AUTOMOBILE STOPS 
The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
states that "the right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated . . . .fl U.S. 
Const, amend. IV. It follows that lf[a]lthough a person has a 
lesser expectation of privacy in a car than in his or her home, 
one does not lose the protection of the Fourth Amendment while in 
an automobile." State v. Schlosser, 774 P.2d 1132, 1135 (Utah 
1989) (citation omitted). Thus, we have held that the stopping 
of an automobile and the consequent detention of its occupants 
constitutes a "seizure" within the meaning of the Fourth 
Amendment "even if the purpose of the stop is limited and the 
resulting detention brief." State v. Steward. 806 P.2d 213, 215 
(Utah App. 1991) (citation omitted). 
However, the Fourth Amendment does not prohibit all 
seizures, but only unreasonable ones. Terrv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 
9, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1873 (1968). Under Terry, the determination 
of whether a seizure is reasonable involves a two-pronged test: 
(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception?, 
and (2) Was the officer's action reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place? Id., 392 U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879; accord State 
v. Robinson, 797 P.2d 431, 435 (Utah App. 1990). 
As to the first prong, stopping an automobile is 
constitutionally justified if the stop is (1) incident to a 
lawful citation for a traffic violation, or (2) based upon a 
reasonable and articulable suspicion that the defendant has 
committed or is about to commit a crime. State v. Talbot. 792 
P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990).l 
In the case at bar, the first prong, whether the stop was 
justified at its inception, is easily satisfied since making a 
turn without signaling is prohibited by Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-
69(1)(a) (1988), and driving without a license is prohibited by 
Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-104 (Supp. 1991). M[A]s long as an officer 
suspects the driver is violating *any one of the multitude of 
applicable traffic and equipment regulations,' the police officer 
may legally stop the vehicle." State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 
883 n.3 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990) 
(quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 660, 99 S. Ct. 1391, 
1400 (1979)); accord Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 109, 98 
S. Ct. 330, 332 (1977); Talbot. 792 P.2d at 491. Therefore, 
Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez's vehicle was clearly justified at 
its inception. 
However, Officer Hamner's actions must also be reasonably 
related in scope to the stop of Lopez's vehicle for the 
aforementioned traffic violations. This determination rests on 
whether Officer Hamner was justified in running a warrants check 
on Lopez without further evidence of criminal activity on Lopez's 
part, an issue of first impression in Utah. Some guidance is 
provided by the Supreme Court's decision in Michigan v. Summers, 
452 U.S. 692, 101 S. Ct. 2587 (1981). In Summers, the Supreme 
Court noted that an officer may communicate with others, either 
police or private citizens, in order to confirm the 
identification of the individual stopped or to determine whether 
that individual is "otherwise wanted,11 unless such action makes 
the period of detention unduly long. Id., 452 U.S. at 700-01 
n.12, 101 S. Ct. at 2593 n.12 (quoting 3 LaFave, Search and 
Seizure § 9.2, pp. 36-37 (1978)). As to the length of such 
detention, the Supreme Court has held that the detention "must be 
temporary and last no longer than is necessary to effectuate the 
purpose of the stop.11 Florida v. Rover, 460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 
S. Ct. 1319, 1325 (1983). Similarly, the Utah Supreme Court has 
stated that the length and scope of a detention for a traffic 
violation "must be * strictly tied to and justified by' the 
1. Since Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez was based upon traffic 
violations, whether Officer Hamner had reasonable suspicion to 
believe that a more serious crime had been or was about to be 
committed need not be examined. State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 
882 (Utah App. 1989). 
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circumstances which rendered its initiation permissible." State 
v. Johnson. 805 P.2d 761, 763 (Utah 1991) (quoting Terry, 392 
U.S. at 19-20, 88 S. Ct. at 1879). Additionally, the Robinson 
case states that M[a]n officer conducting a routine traffic stop 
may request a driver's license and vehicle registration, conduct 
a computer check, and issue a citation." Robinson, 797 P.2d at 
435 (emphasis added) (citing United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 
1512, 1519 (10th Cir. 1988)). While Robinson did not 
specifically address the question of whether running a warrants 
check exceeds the lawful basis for a traffic stop, conducting a 
computer check most certainly can be read to include a warrants 
check. 
Moreover, other jurisdictions which have considered the very 
question of conducting warrants checks during the course of a 
traffic stop have held that such action is permissible so long as 
it does not significantly extend the period of detention. See, 
e.g., United States v. Contreras-Diaz, 575 F.2d 740, 744-45 (9th 
Cir.), cert, denied, 439 U.S. 855, 99 S. Ct. 167 (1978); State v. 
Ybarra, 156 Ariz. 275, 751 P.2d 591, 592 (1987); Storm v. State, 
736 P.2d 1000, 1001-02 (Okla. Crim. App. 1987); State v. Nelson, 
76 Or. App. 67, 708 P.2d 1153, 1155 (1985); State v. Smith, 73 
Or. App. 287, 698 P.2d 973, 976 (1985) (citing State v. Perrv, 39 
Or. App. 37, 42, 591 P.2d 379, 382 (1979); State v. Carter, 34 
Or. App. 21, 32, 578 P.2d 790, 796-97 (1978), aff'd. 287 Or. 479, 
600 P.2d 873 (1979)); Petty v. State, 696 S.W.2d 635, 638-39 
(Tex. App. 1985); cf. United States v. Luckett, 484 F.2d 89, 90-
91 (9th Cir. 1973) (evidence inadmissible because running 
warrants check extended detention beyond scope of original reason 
for stop). I find this authority persuasive, and would adopt the 
rule that running a warrants check in the course of a traffic 
stop is permissible, so long as it does not significantly extend 
the period of detention beyond that reasonably necessary to 
effectuate the original purpose of the stop. 
Applying this rule to the case at bar, I would hold that 
since the warrants check was conducted within the course of 
Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez for traffic violations, it did not 
exceed the scope of that stop, and was therefore permissible. 
Moreover, although Officer Hamner's attention was initially drawn 
to Lopez's car for reasons other than those for which he stopped 
Lopez, this "does not insulate the defendant from being stopped 
for a traffic violation." State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 
(Utah App. 1989) (citing State v. Tucker, 286 Or. 485, 595 P.2d 
1364, 1368-70 (1979)). Accordingly, Officer Hamner's stop of 
Lopez's vehicle was proper, and the subsequent seizure was valid. 
II. PRETEXT DOCTRINE 
However, the majority's position that the test for pretext 
established in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah App. 1988), 
disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 689-92 
(Utah 1990), should be applied to the facts in this case must 
also be addressed. The Sierra test for pretext in traffic stop 
cases is based on the following language from Scott v. United 
States, 436 U.S. 128, 98 S. Ct. 1717 (1978): "would the facts 
available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search *warrant [an officer] of reasonable caution in the belief' 
that the action taken was appropriate?" Sierra. 754 P.2d 972 at 
977-78 (quoting Scott. 436 U.S. at 137, 98 S. Ct. at 1723). 
Thus, the Sierra court reasoned that in traffic stop cases the 
"focus [is] on whether a hypothetical reasonable officer, in view 
of the totality of the circumstances confronting him or her, 
would have stopped [the defendant] to issue a [citation]." 
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 978 (emphasis in original). 
I would decline to apply Sierra to the facts in this case 
for several reasons.2 My initial concern centers on the fact 
that the Scott test focuses on whether an officer's suspicion of 
criminal activity is reasonable, a factor which cannot be readily 
translated to apply in traffic stop cases. The Scott case 
involved a determination of whether the officer had a reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity in light of the facts known to him 
at that time. Put differently, did the circumstances, viewed 
objectively, justify the action taken? Scott. 436 U.S. at 137-
38, 98 S. Ct. at 1723. In traffic stop cases, however, that 
question will always be answered in the affirmative since 
issuance of a citation is always justified when the officer 
2. Moreover, even if I agreed that the Sierra "reasonable 
officer" test should be applied, I would nonetheless dissent from 
the majority's determination that the case must be remanded for 
reanalysis under Sierra and further factual findings. In State 
v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774 (Utah 1991), the Utah Supreme Court 
recently reaffirmed that appellate courts in this state will 
affirm the trial court "even when it fail[s] to make findings on 
the record whenever it would be reasonable to assume that the 
court actually made such findings." Jd. at 787-88 n.6. (citing 
Mower v. McCarthy, 122 Utah 1, 6, 245 P.2d 224, 226 (1952)). 
Since we have previously held that failing to signal before 
turning "is the type of clear cut traffic violation for which 
officers routinely stop citizens and issue citations," State v. 
Smith, 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App. 1989) (citations omitted), 
even under the Sierra "reasonable officer" test, this court 
should hold that Officer Hamner's stop of Lopez's vehicle was 
not a pretext stop. 
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observes a statute being violated. Police officers have a sworn 
duty to enforce all laws passed by the legislature, including 
traffic laws. Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) of the Motor 
Vehicle Act provides: 
The commission, and such officers and 
inspectors of the department as it shall 
designate, peace officers, state patrolmen, 
and others duly authorized by the department 
or by law shall have power and rt shall be 
their duty: 
(a) To enforce the provisions 
of this act and of all other laws 
regulating the registration or 
operation of vehicles or the use of 
the highways. 
(b) To make arrests upon view 
and without warrant for any 
violation committed in their 
presence of any of the provisions 
of this act or other law regulating 
the operation of vehicles or the 
use of the highways. 
(c) When on duty, upon 
reasonable belief that any vehicle 
is being operated in violation of 
any provision of this act or of any 
other law regulating the operation 
of vehicles to require the driver 
thereof to stop, exhibit his 
driver's license and the 
registration card issued for the 
vehicles and submit to an 
inspection of such vehicle, the 
registration plates and 
registration card thereon. 
Id. (emphasis added). Thus, police officers do not have the 
discretion to determine which laws would be reasonable to 
enforce• Such action is appropriate whenever an officer suspects 
that the driver is violating one of the applicable traffic 
regulations. State v. Marshall. 791 P.2d 880, 883 n.3 (Utah 
App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Talbot, 
792 P.2d 489, 491 (Utah App. 1990); accord State v. Sanders, 154 
Ga. App. 305, 267 S.E.2d 906 (1980); Braxton v. State. 234 Md. 1, 
197 A.2d 841 (1964); Anderson v. State. 444 P.2d 239 (Okla. Crim. 
1968) . 
r» r.r\ / c / -..' 
Also, police officers cannot be expected, every time they 
observe a violation of law, to make a legal decision whether or 
not a "reasonable officer" would arrest the violator. In fact, 
even those cases in which the Sierra test has been successfully 
met do not establish a standard by which the State can prove that 
a hypothetical reasonable officer would stop the vehicle. In one 
case, the fact that the officer at hand often makes such arrests 
was found to be relevant. See State v. Loveoren, 798 P.2d 767, 
771 n.10 (Utah App. 1990). In another, the court determined that 
the stop was justified based on the fact that other jurisdictions 
had so held under similar circumstances. See Marshall, 791 P.2d 
at 883. In a third, the trial court's decision that the 
violation in question "is the type of clear cut traffic violation 
for which officers routinely stop citizens and issue citations" 
was sufficient. See State v. Smith. 781 P.2d 879, 883 (Utah App. 
1989) . If the courts have not been able to articulate a standard 
for determining what a hypothetical reasonable officer would do, 
how can the police be expected to make on-the-spot judgments on 
this difficult legal question? 
Nor can the enforceability of state laws depend upon the 
diligence by which police officers usually enforce such laws. 
Otherwise, derelict officers would set the standard by which laws 
would be enforced and thus limit diligent officers in performing 
their duty. Although the majority proposes that the pretext 
doctrine requires that police be consistent in their enforcement 
of traffic regulations, just the opposite is true. To allow 
police officers to decide which laws should or should not be 
enforced would destroy the uniform application of laws throughout 
the state, since what might appear reasonable to officers in one 
part of the state might appear different to officers in other 
parts of the state. Accordingly, while the stopping of a vehicle 
merely to confirm or deny a "hunch," see Talbot. 792 P.2d at 491-
92 n.6, cannot be condoned, neither can it be left to police 
officers to determine which traffic laws it would be reasonable 
to enforce. 
And finally, to hold that the police or the courts can 
determine what laws are reasonable enough to enforce creates a 
separation of powers problem. Although it is the judiciary's 
responsibility to determine the constitutionality of the laws, 
Dean v. Ramoton, 556 P.2d 205, 206-07 (Utah 1976) (citing Marbury 
v. Madison. 1 Cranch 137, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803); State v. Betensen, 
14 Utah 2d 121, 378 P.2d 669 (1963)), it is not within the 
province of the executive branch or judicial branch to say 
whether those laws are reasonable. Such is clearly an invasion 
of the legislature's jurisdiction. ,f[I]t is not our prerogative 
to question the wisdom, social desirability, or public policy 
underlying a given statute. Those are matters left exclusively 
to the legislature's judgment and determination." Condemarin v. 
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University HOSP.. 775 P.2d 348, 377 (Utah 1989) (Hall, J., 
dissenting) (citations omitted); accord Masich v. United States 
Smelting. Ref. & Mining Co,. 113 Utah 101, 126-27, 191 P.2d 612, 
625, appeal dismissed. 335 U.S. 866, 69 S. Ct. 138 (1948); Utah 
Manufacturers' Ass'n v. Stewart. 82 Utah 198, 23 P.2d 229, 232 
(1933) ("fairly debatable questions as to reasonableness, wisdom, 
or propriety [of legislative action] are not for the courts, but 
for the Legislature"). Thus, it is violative of the principle of 
separation of powers to allow the police or the courts to 
determine whether it is reasonable to enforce any law duly passed 
by the legislature. Accordingly, Sierra should not be applied to 
cases such as this. 
Nonetheless, there are cases in which pretext is relevant 
and must be considered. These cases differ from the case at bar 
in one significant aspect: a finding by the trial court that 
actually no violation occurred or that the stop was admittedly 
made for reasons other than the traffic violation. Thus, in 
cases such as State v. Arrovo. 796 P.2d 684, 688 (Utah 1990), 
where no violation occurred, pretext can be thereby established 
by the absence of a legitimate cause to stop the vehicle. Here, 
however, the undisputed testimony of Officer Hamner is that Lopez 
made a left turn without signaling and was driving without a 
license. Compare id.; see also Talbot. 792 P.2d at 491-92 
(pretext analysis used when no indication that defendants were 
stopped for any traffic violation and where stop was in fact made 
for other reasons); State v. Baird. 763 P.2d 1214, 1217 (Utah 
App. 1988) (pretext analysis used where facts demonstrate that 
the driver did not commit a traffic violation); Sierra, 754 P.2d 
at 979 (pretext analysis used when no indication in record that 
defendant had violated any traffic statutes).3 
3. Similarly, a number of the pretext cases from other 
jurisdictions that are cited by the majority involve situations 
in which no traffic violation had occurred or where the stop was 
admittedly made for reasons other than a traffic violation. See. 
e.g., United States v. Smith. 799 F.2d 704, 706 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(officer admitted that he did not stop the vehicle because it 
"weaved," but because of his reliance on a "drug courier 
profile"); Kehoe v. State. 521 So. 2d 1094, 1095 (Fla. 1988) 
(officer admitted that he stopped the vehicle primarily because 
he was told by another officer to do so, not because of a traffic 
violation); Tarwid v. State. 184 Ga. App. 853, 363 S.E.2d 63, 64-
65 (1987) (officer admitted that at the time of the stop, 
defendants were not committing any traffic violations). Others 
involve stops which would have to be invalidated as exceeding the 
scope under the two-prong Terry test analysis proposed herein. 
See, e.g., United States v. Guzman. 864 F.2d 1512, 1514 (10th 
(continued...) 
Furthermore, Arrovo does not approve the Sierra "reasonable 
officer" test, in the broad sense that the majority believes. 
While the Utah Supreme Court did approve the court of appeals's 
determination that the stop in that case was an unconstitutional 
pretext, it did so on the basis of the following facts: 
8. As a result [of] Trooper Mangelson's 
training at [a] seminar, he admitted that 
whenever he observed an Hispanic individual 
driving a vehicle he wanted to stop the 
vehicle. The Trooper also admitted that once 
he stopped an Hispanic driver, 80% of the 
time he requested permission to search the 
vehicle. 
14. Under cross-examination, the 
Trooper denied that it was his normal 
procedure when issuing a citation to an 
individual for "Following too Close" to 
record the license plate of the front car. 
However, the Trooper's denial on this point 
was contradicted by tape recorded testimony 
from the Trooper at the preliminary hearing 
held in this matter. The Trooper admitted 
that he had not recorded the license plate 
number of the front car in this case. 
15. The Defendant testified that he was 
at least 85 to 95 feet or nine car lengths, 
behind the vehicle immediately in front of 
his own. The Court finds this testimony to 
be credible. 
16. In contrast, the Court is 
unpersuaded that Trooper Mangelson rightfully 
determined that the Defendant was "Following 
too Close" or that any other attested facts 
3, (.••continued) 
Cir. 1988) (rather than issuing a warning or citation, officer 
conducted a further investigation admittedly to determine whether 
defendants were "hauling contraband in the vehicle"); People v. 
Camarre, 171 A.D.2d 1002, 569 N.Y.S.2d 223, 224, appeal denied. 
573 N.Y.S.2d 649, 578 N.E.2d 447 (1991) ("What occurred was not a 
traffic arrest, but a full-blown arrest based on suspicion of 
drug activity, as evidenced by the fact that the defendant was 
frisked and placed in handcuffs."). 
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preponderated to the level necessary to 
permit a constitutional stop of the 
Defendant's vehicle. Moreover, the Court 
finds that the Trooper's own testimony 
established the probability that no violation 
of law occurred, and that the alleged 
violation was only a pretext asserted by the 
Trooper to justify his stop of a vehicle with 
out of state license plates and with 
occupants of Latin origin. 
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 688 n.3. Thus, it is clear that the Utah 
Supreme Court did not adopt the Sierra "reasonable officer" test, 
but merely found that the evidence, including the trooper's 
admissions, indicated that no traffic violation had occurred, and 
based its conclusion that the stop was an unconstitutional 
pretext on that indication. 
Additionally, the majority's argument that the pretext 
doctrine is beneficial because it restricts police discretion 
when used unconstitutionally is also without merit. As noted 
above, Utah Code Ann. § 41-1-17 (1988) of the Motor Vehicle Act 
explicitly provides that whenever a police officer witnesses a 
violation of any of the laws regulating the registration or 
operation of vehicles or the use of the highways, he or she has 
an affirmative duty to enforce that law. No police discretion is 
provided for, and none can be read into the statute. 
Accordingly, it makes little sense to argue that discretion is 
being restricted where none, in fact, exists. 
Nor does it follow that limiting the use of the pretext 
doctrine will result in selective and arbitrary enforcement of 
the traffic laws. If evidence of selective enforcement exists, 
then the remedy, as in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S. Ct. 
1064 (1886), is to hold that the statute, while facially 
constitutional, was unconstitutionally applied. The solution is 
not, as the majority suggests, to apply the pretext doctrine in 
the name of restricting a nonexistent police discretion, but 
instead to limit unconstitutional police action by returning to 
the sound principles of Terrv v. Ohio and Delaware v. Prouse. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The majority expresses its concern that the police will ride 
roughshod over the citizenry if the Sierra doctrine is not 
applied to cases such as this. I disagree. Sufficient 
protection against unwarranted searches and seizures of 
defendants can be achieved by the application of the two-pronged 
Terrv test, which simply requires the answering of two questions: 
-> c 
(1) Was the police officer's action justified at its inception?, 
and (2) Was the officer's action reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interference in the first 
place? Terrv v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19-20, 88 S. Ct. 1868, 1879 
(1968). The Terry test sufficiently limits the police officer's 
actions in such cases to those within the scope and duration of 
the original stop, in this case, to running a computer check, 
which may include a driver's license check and/or warrants 
search, and issuing a citation. Thus, the officer will not be 
able to use the traffic stop as a springboard into further 
investigation unless in the course of such a stop, a reasonable 
suspicion, based on articulable facts, of criminal activity 
arises, or the computer check reveals an arrest warrant. If the 
computer check or other circumstances do not reveal a reason to 
further detain the individual, the officer must simply issue the 
citation and allow the individual to leave. 
Thus, in the case at bar, I would conclude that Officer 
Hamner's stop of Lopez for the traffic violation was proper, as 
was the warrants check made within the duration of such stop, as 
was the arrest based on the warrants, and that the subsequent 
inventory search of Lopez's vehicle during impoundment and 
seizure of the cocaine found therein was valid. Accordingly, the 
trial court's order granting suppression of the evidence should 
be reversed and remanded for trial in which the evidence should 
be included.4 
Leonard H. Russon, Judge 
4. Lastly, I feel compelled to respond to footnote six of the 
majority's opinion, wherein it states that all of the other 
judges of the Utah Court of Appeals have cited the Sierra 
doctrine with approval. Much of present-day law is based on the 
wisdom of lone dissenters. Otherwise, the law would never 
progressively improve. If such were not the case, Dred Scott v. 
Sanford, 19 How. 393, 60 U.S. 393, 15 L. Ed. 691 (1857), would 
still be good law, and Brown v. Board of Educ« of Tooeka. Kan,, 
349 U.S. 294, 75 S. Ct. 753 (1955) might never have changed the 
"separate but equal11 doctrine of Plessv v. Ferguson. 163 U.S. 
537, 16 S. Ct. 1138 (1896). 
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